18-1597-cv

Ragbir et al. v. Homan et al.

John M. Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge, dissenting:

2 Although I agree with much of the reasoning in the majority opinion, because I would not remand the case for further proceedings 3 or reach the issue of whether Ragbir's claim fits within the 4 "outrageous" exception to § 1252(g)'s withdrawal of jurisdiction that 5 was articulated by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-6 Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 488–92 (1999) [hereinafter 7 "AADC"], I respectfully dissent. 8 In my view, remand is not warranted because the 9 10 Government's retaliation against Ragbir has ended and its taint has Ragbir plausibly alleged that the Government's 11 dissipated. retaliation occurred on January 11, 2018 and included terminating his 12 third administrative stay early, arresting him on the spot without 13 14 prior notice, and attempting to immediately deport him by transporting him from New York City to Florida and incarcerating 15 him there. But the taint of any retaliation ended no later than January 16 29, 2018, more than a year ago, when Ragbir was released from 17 custody following the district court's grant of his habeas corpus 18 petition. Importantly, that grant was ordered not so Ragbir could 19 20 remain in the United States, but to allow him "an orderly departure"

and "the freedom to say goodbye." Ragbir v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-236

22 (KBF), 2018 WL 623557, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018). Benefiting from

litigation-prompted stays, Ragbir has yet to be removed.

Ragbir, in this proceeding, has never taken issue with the fact 1 that he is subject to a valid removal order entered in March 2007 as a 2 result of his felony conviction for wire fraud. Nor does he dispute 3 that no stay prevents his removal other than the one entered by this 4 court in this appeal. It is the stated policy of the current executive 5 branch to "prioritize for removal . . . removable aliens who [h]ave 6 been convicted of any criminal offense." Exec. Order. No. 13,768, 82 7 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 8 HOMELAND SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS TO 9 SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST (2017), at 3 ("criminal aliens are a 10 priority for removal"). Although this has also been the stated policy 11 of past administrations, enforcement practices on the ground can 12 differ from administration to administration. One would have to be 13 14 blind not to notice that the change of administration in January 2017 has brought with it an unremitting focus on deporting convicted 15 felons, such as Ragbir. See U.S. Immigration and Customs 16 ENFORCEMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL 17 OPERATIONS REPORT, at 14 (In fiscal year 2018, ICE "conducted 256,085 18 removals – the highest level since FY2014" and prioritized "public 19

¹ We may take judicial notice of written materials "[w]hen there is no dispute as to the authenticity of such materials and judicial notice is limited to law, legislative facts, or factual matters that are incontrovertible, such notice is admissible." *Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of N.Y.*, 691 F.2d 1070, 1086 (2d Cir. 1982).

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safety threats and immigration violators, as reflected by the fact that,

like in FY2017, 9 out of 10 [ICE] administrative arrests had either a

criminal conviction(s), pending charge(s), were an ICE fugitive, or

4 illegally reentered the country after previously being removed.").2

For the above reasons, I disagree with the majority's contention that the consequences of the Government's retaliation continue because, but for the retaliation, Ragbir would plausibly have obtained a further extension of his administrative stay from an administration that has steadfastly sought to deport him, much less another two-year extension. Under these circumstances, I see no reason for this case to

I also have reservations about the majority's discussion of *AADC's* "outrageous" exception to the § 1252(g) removal of jurisdiction. As a preliminary matter, I fail to see the necessity of

continue in the district court, further impeding Ragbir's removal.³

² The Government has also represented to this court in a related case that "Ragbir has been issued a so-called 'bag and baggage' letter notifying him that he is to report to ICE for removal. (Dist. Ct. ECF No. 49). Thus, at this point it has been made abundantly clear to him that, once any judicial impediment to his removal has been lifted, it is substantially likely that the government will promptly effectuate his removal." Reply Memorandum for Respondents-Appellants at 5, *Ragbir v. Sessions* (2d Cir.) (No. 18-1595).

³ Any concern by the majority that Ragbir's prompt removal now would somehow revive the previous retaliation of more than a year ago could presumably be addressed by the recusal of the officer who made the decisions in January 2018. This would enable a previously uninvolved officer to independently decide whether to enforce the March 2007 order of removal without regard to the circumstances that are alleged to have prompted the Government's actions in January 2018.

addressing this issue at all given the majority's conclusion that Ragbir 1 2 is entitled to a habeas corpus proceeding under the Suspension Clause despite § 1252(g)'s withdrawal of jurisdiction. That he is 3 permitted to bring a habeas proceeding would allow us to consider 4 Ragbir's case regardless of whether the Government's conduct falls 5 within the "outrageous" exception contemplated by AADC. As I read 6 AADC, that exception was predicated on the assumption that habeas 7 relief was not available or would come too late, AADC, 525 U.S. at 8 487–88, indicating that it is unnecessary to undertake this analysis if 9 timely habeas relief *is* available. 10 Second, despite the majority's statement that it is not 11 "delineat[ing] the boundaries of what constitutes an 'outrageous' 12 claim within the meaning of AADC," it creates from whole cloth a 13 14 five-factor balancing test to determine whether the Government's conduct was "outrageous." I am concerned that, because this test will 15 be the standard by which future claims are evaluated, it will become 16 an open door for evading the will of Congress in enacting § 1252(g). 17 Considering only the "Government's discretionary prerogative" 18 gives short shrift to the Government's significant enforcement 19 20 interests and does not provide a framework for adequately considering the Government's actions in context. 21 22 Turning to the facts of this case, although the majority opinion acknowledges that Ragbir is a criminal alien subject to a valid removal 23

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order, it quickly discounts this fact by arguing that Ragbir has no duty to leave the country on his own, unlike an alien who unlawfully

3 enters and therefore is engaged in a continuing violation of law. To

4 my mind, however, the Government's interest in removing a criminal

5 alien, heightened when the executive branch has a stated policy of

6 prioritizing the removal of criminal aliens, is at least as strong as the

7 Government's interest in "bring[ing] to an end an ongoing violation

8 of United States law" by one who has simply overstayed his visa.

9 AADC, 525 U.S. at 491 (emphasis omitted).

Finally, although I agree that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the Government acted improperly when it shortened Ragbir's administrative stay, arrested him, and held him in custody in preparation for his departure, there was nothing inherently unlawful in these acts which, absent improper motive, are fully authorized when enforcing an alien's removal. I can easily imagine much more "outrageous" acts of government impropriety, such as the deliberate and unjustified use of grossly excessive force or vindictive placement in solitary confinement. Therefore, I am not at all convinced that the Government's actions against Ragbir were "outrageous" under the circumstances.

21 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.